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GHASTLY SIGNS AND TOKENS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGE TO SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
CHRISTOPHER LOGEL*
ABSTRACT 
Since its popular reemergence in the 1980s, courts have not placed 
significant restrictions on the use of solitary confinement. One small 
exception has appeared. Lower courts have held that placing prisoners 
with preexisting severe mental illness in solitary confinement violates 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.1 Can this relatively limited 
rule be expanded to abolish solitary confinement altogether?  
This Comment argues that it can. A large body of diverse research 
demonstrates that prolonged solitary confinement causes severe 
mental illness in most prisoners, regardless of their medical history.2 
By extension, because there is no principled basis for distinguishing 
between preexisting and confinement-induced mental illness, solitary 
confinement must end for all prisoners.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
I believe that very few men are capable of estimating the immense 
amount of torture and agony which this dreadful punishment, 
prolonged for years, inflicts upon the sufferers; and in guessing at it 
myself, and in reasoning from what I have seen written upon their 
 
* Associate Attorney at Pinix Law. The author thanks his wife Santhi Logel for her love and 
support; Professor Cecelia Klingele for sharing her legal wisdom; and Shelley Fite and Joseph Bugni for 
their support and mentorship. 
1. See infra notes 125–127 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra notes 25–37 and accompanying text. 
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faces, and what to my certain knowledge they feel within, I am only the 
more convinced that there is a depth of terrible endurance in which 
none but the sufferers themselves can fathom, and which no man has 
a right to inflict upon his fellow creature. I hold this slow and daily 
tampering with the mysteries of the brain, to be immeasurably worse 
than any torture of the body; and because its ghastly signs and tokens 
are not so palpable to the eye and sense of touch as scars upon the 
flesh; because its wounds are not upon the surface, and it extorts few 
cries that human ears can hear; therefore the more I denounce it, as a 
secret punishment which slumbering humanity is not roused up to 
stay.3 
 
Solitary confinement—the segregation of an inmate for at least 22 hours per 
day in a cell without social interaction—is a cruel but not unusual punishment in 
contemporary American prisons.4 Many inmates relegated to solitary confinement 
are in “prolonged solitary confinement,” which the UN has classified as torture.5 
Yet, despite bipartisan calls to end the practice, prolonged solitary confinement is 
still widespread in the United States.6 Worse yet, solitary confinement has emerged 
almost entirely unscathed from constitutional challenges.7 However, these 
challenges have not been entirely futile—they have revealed one significant 
limitation on the use of solitary confinement. Specifically, all courts addressing the 
issue have held that a prison may not put inmates with preexisting severe mental 
illness into prolonged solitary confinement.8 For those courts, the presence of a 
severe mental illness raises an ordinarily permissible practice into one that violates 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.9 
This comment advances a logical extension of the rule against placing 
prisoners with severe mental illness in solitary confinement. It argues that the 
justification for prohibiting the use of solitary confinement on prisoners with 
preexisting severe mental illnesses cannot be rationally limited to only those 
prisoners. A large body of research demonstrates that prolonged solitary 
confinement causes severe mental illness in most prisoners, even those without a 
 
3. Charles Dickens, American Notes for Gen. Circulation 51 (Peterson’s uniform ed. of Dickens’ 
works 1859). 
4. See infra Part I.A; see also Sharon Shalev, A Sourcebook on Solitary Confinement, London 
Mannheim Centre for Criminology, London School of Economics and Political Science (2008), 
http://solitaryconfinement.org/uploads/sourcebook_web.pdf. 
5. The UN classifies solitary confinement in excess of fifteen days as torture. See Juan E. Méndez 
(Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council), Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human 
Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 21, U.N. 
Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011) [hereinafter UNHRC Report]. 
6. See, e.g., George F. Will, The Torture of Solitary Confinement, Wash. Post (Feb. 20, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/george-will-the-torture-of-solitary-
confinement/2013/02/20/ae115d74-7ac9-11e2-9a75-dab0201670da_story.html; Barack Obama, Why 
We Must Rethink Solitary Confinement, Wash. Post (Jan. 25, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barack-obama-why-we-must-rethink-solitary-
confinement/2016/01/25/29a361f2-c384-11e5-8965-0607e0e265ce_story.html. 
7. See infra Part I.B, I.C. 
8. See infra notes 113 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 102–104 and accompanying text. 
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history of mental illness.10 And because there is no principled basis for 
distinguishing between preexisting and solitary-confinement-caused mental illness, 
the ban on solitary confinement must be extended to protect both groups of 
prisoners. This comment proceeds in two parts. Part I provides background on the 
current state of prolonged solitary confinement in the United States. This includes 
information on solitary confinement practices, the medical effect of those practices 
on prisoners, and a discussion of the current state of the law. Part II draws on this 
background information to advance arguments against solitary confinement. The 
Comment concludes with practical suggestions for advancing anti-solitary 
confinement litigation. 
II. PROLONGED SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
Attacks against prolonged solitary confinement have largely been ineffective. 
Legal progress—where it exists—has been scarce, and the core of the practice 
remains intact.11 As a result, at any given moment more than four-and-a-half 
percent of the American prison population is in solitary confinement.12 This part 
describes the use of solitary confinement in the United States today and the history 
of previous challenges to its use. 
 A. The Scope and Effect of Prolonged Solitary Confinement 
Today, roughly 60,000 prisoners in the United States are housed in solitary 
confinement.13 Some are confined in so-called “supermax” prisons, others in local 
jails.14 The reasons for placement in solitary confinement include but are not limited 
to: incapacitation (preventing the prisoner from harming others or vice-versa); 
deterrence (discouraging future bad behavior); punishment (making prisoners 
suffer because of past bad behavior); and necessity (such as a shortage of cells in 
other parts of the system).15 
 
10. See infra notes 12–45 and accompanying text. 
11. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). 
12. THE ASSOCIATION OF STATE CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATORS, REFORMING RESTRICTIVE 
HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 4 (2018) [hereinafter ASCA-
LIMAN 2018]. 
13. Id. at 4–6. In past years, similar studies by the same body have placed the number of prisoners 
in solitary confinement at between 80,000–100,000. See THE ASSOCIATION OF STATE CORRECTIONAL 
ADMINISTRATORS, TIME-IN-CELL THE ASCA-LIMAN 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN 
PRISON 10 (2015). 
14. See generally ASCA-LIMAN 2018, supra note 13, at 4–6; Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 213–14 
(discussing solitary confinement conditions in an Ohio “Supermax” prison). 
15. See Lindley A. Bassett, Note, The Constitutionality of Solitary Confinement: Insights from 
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, 26 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L. MED. 403, 412 (2016); Shira E. Gordon, Note, Solitary 
Confinement, Public Safety, and Recidivism, 47 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 495, 500–501 (2014).  In some 
overcrowded jails, prisoners start in solitary confinement until a spot opens in general population. At 
other times, a shortage of juvenile facilities necessitates the use of solitary confinement. See Taylor 
Elizabeth Eldridge, Rikers Doesn’t Put Teens in Solitary. Other New York Jails Do, THE MARSHALL PROJECT 
(Oct. 4, 2019, 5:15 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/03/28/rikers-doesn-t-put-teens-in-
solitary-other-new-york-jails-do. 
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As the term is used in this comment, solitary confinement is defined as 
isolating a prisoner in a small cell for at least twenty-two hours per day.16 Beyond 
this baseline, the conditions of confinement vary greatly among different prison 
systems.17 For example, in some facilities, prisoners in solitary confinement can 
purchase televisions, radios, and books.18 The conditions in other facilities are much 
worse: 
Inmates on Level One at the State of Wisconsin's Supermax 
Correctional Institution in Boscobel, Wisconsin spend all but four 
hours a week confined to a cell. The “boxcar” style door on the 
cell is solid except for a shutter and a trap door that opens into 
the dead space of a vestibule through which a guard may transfer 
items to the inmate without interacting with him. The cells are 
illuminated 24 hours a day. Inmates receive no outdoor exercise. 
Their personal possessions are severely restricted: one religious 
text, one box of legal materials and 25 personal letters. They are 
permitted no clocks, radios, watches, cassette players or 
televisions. The temperature fluctuates wildly, reaching 
extremely high and low temperatures depending on the season. 
A video camera rather than a human eye monitors the inmate's 
movements. Visits other than with lawyers are conducted 
through video screens.19 
But regardless of the details, the common feature of solitary confinement is 
extreme isolation. Generally, prisoners spend days—or even months—alone in 
their cells, without the ability to communicate or interact with other human 
beings.20 
The psychological effects of this profound isolation are not uniform.21 In 
general, people with higher intelligence and better socialization have a lower 
incidence of adverse reactions to social isolation.22 Differences in the conditions 
accompanying isolation as well as the perceived purpose for being in isolation also 
affect individual responses.23 But almost universally, a prisoner’s experience in 
prolonged solitary confinement rises far above the level of simple unhappiness.24 
 
16. See ASCA-LIMAN 2018, supra note 13, at 4 (using the same definition). 
17. See, e.g., id. at 14–15 (surveying length of time in restrictive housing). 
18. AMNESTY INT’L, USA, Cruel Isolation: Amnesty International’s Concerns About Conditions in 
Arizona Maximum Security Prisons, 4–5 (2012) (describing conditions in Arizona’s Eyman prison 
complex). Differences in privileges are often a function of a prisoner’s disciplinary posture. See, e.g., id. 
19. Jones ‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1098 (W.D. Wis. 2001). 
20. ASCA-LIMAN 2018, supra note 13, at 4–6. 
21. See Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History 
and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 474–75 (2006); Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of 
Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 325, 358 (2006) (discussing studies on the effects of social 
isolation on polar explorers). 
22. See Grassian, supra note 22, at 358. 
23. See id. at 346–49. 
24. UNHRC Report, supra note 6, at 21 (finding that “solitary confinement beyond 15 days 
constitutes torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”). Clearly, American 
courts do not agree with this characterization or they would have long ago held that solitary confinement 
was impermissible under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 
135–36 (1878) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits torture). 
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More often than not, prolonged solitary confinement causes severe mental illness 
in otherwise healthy prisoners.25 
When solitary confinement first became popular in nineteenth- century 
America, it was a pioneering development in prison systems.26 The gold standard 
among penitentiaries was in Philadelphia, and this method of incarceration became 
known as the “Philadelphia System.”27 The prison was open to the public and 
international observers, such as Alex de Tocqueville (France), Charles Dickens 
(England), and Nicholas Julius (Prussia), famously toured and later wrote about 
American prisons.28 Importantly, the Philadelphia System relegated nearly all 
prisoners to solitary confinement.29 The international observers reported that 
prisoners in solitary confinement suffered from a myriad of severe psychological 
problems including self-mutilation, “circular insanity,” and psychosis.30 
When European countries began to experiment with variants on the 
Philadelphia System, contemporary scientific literature confirmed what observers 
had reported. Between 1854 and 1909, German doctors published nearly forty 
studies documenting psychological illness amongst inmates both in general 
population and solitary confinement.31 These studies concluded that solitary 
confinement caused a variety of severe mental problems in inmates such as 
hallucinations, persecutory delusions, hyperresponsiveness to stimuli, acute 
confusion, and memory disturbances.32 
In contrast to the nineteenth century, studying solitary- confinement-caused 
mental illness in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has proved difficult.33 
First, the primary method of research is interviewing prisoners.34 But interviewing 
a prisoner relieves the pressure of the social isolation that causes their problems in 
the first place, thereby affecting the validity of the resulting research.35 Second, 
there are various methodological issues with existing studies, including but not 
limited to: possible researcher bias, small sample size, lack of replication, 
institutional incentives for prisoners to downplay their symptoms, and an absence 
of control groups.36 
 
25. See generally Smith, supra note 22. 
26. Grassian, supra note 21, at 328, 340–41. 
27. Id. at 328. 
28. Id. at 340–41. 
29. Id. at 328. 
30. Grassian, supra note 212, at 338–43, 367–73; Smith, supra note 212, at 451. The psychological 
descriptors of the day were not nearly as precise as modern statistically based taxonomy. 
31. Grassian, supra note 212, at 367. 
32. Id. at 367–72. 
33. See Note, The Psychology of Cruelty: Recognizing Grave Mental Harm in American Prisons, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1250 n.4, 1265–67 (2015) [hereinafter The Psychology of Cruelty]. 
34. See generally, Grassian, supra note 212. 
35. See Smith, supra note 212, at 478–79. 
36. See id. at 476–87. 
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Notwithstanding these issues, the overwhelming corpus of research shows 
that prolonged solitary confinement causes severe mental illness.37 In a thorough 
review of the existing literature, scholar Peter Scharff Smith concluded: 
[T]he overall conclusion must be that solitary confinement—regardless of 
specific conditions and regardless of time and place—causes serious health 
problems for a significant number of inmates. The central harmful feature is that it 
reduces meaningful social contact to an absolute minimum: a level of social and 
psychological stimulus that many individuals will experience as insufficient to 
remain reasonably healthy and relatively well functioning.38 
And the judiciary seems to agree—as one district court observed: 
Confinement in a supermaximum security prison . . . is 
known to cause severe psychiatric morbidity, disability, suffering 
and mortality. Prisoners in segregated housing units who have no 
history of serious mental illness and who are not prone to 
psychiatric decompensation (breakdown) often develop a 
constellation of symptoms known as “[Segregated Housing Unit] 
Syndrome.” Although SHU Syndrome is not an officially 
recognized diagnostic category, it is made up of official diagnoses 
such as paranoid delusional disorder, dissociative disorder, 
schizophrenia and panic disorder. The extremely isolating 
conditions in supermaximum confinement cause SHU Syndrome 
in relatively healthy prisoners who have histories of serious 
mental illness, as well as prisoners who have never suffered a 
breakdown in the past but are prone to break down when the 
stress and trauma become exceptionally severe. Many prisoners 
are not capable of maintaining their sanity in such an extreme and 
stressful environment; a high number attempt suicide.39 
Although the overall effect of prolonged solitary confinement on prisoners is 
clear, methodological variance among studies precludes absolute statements about 
the universal occurrence of particular symptoms.40 Nonetheless, common 
symptoms include: delirium,41 hyperresponsiveness to stimuli,42 physiological 
symptoms,43 confusion and impaired concentration,44 hallucinations and 
 
37. See id. at 475. 
38. Id. at 503. 
39. Jones’El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1101–02 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (emphasis added). It should 
be noted that “supermaximum” prisons house their prisoners in solitary confinement. See, Mikel-
Meredith Weidman, Comment, The Culture of Judicial Deference and the Problem of Supermax Prisons, 
51 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1506–07 (2004) (“Supermax prisons are uniquely harsh, high-tech facilities that 
house inmates typically identified as the ‘worst of the worst.’ Inmates are characteristically kept in 
solitary confinement for twenty-three hours a day, in cells designed to minimize sensory stimulation and 
human contact.”).   
40. See Smith, supra note 212, at 493–94. 
41. As verified by electroencephalogram (EEG) readings. See Grassian, supra note 212, at 331. 
42. Id. An unfortunate side-effect of this condition is that prisoners tend to either withdraw into 
themselves, increasing the severity of their mental illness, or in the alternative to act out—sometimes 
violently—which provides prison officials with ample justification for keeping them in solitary 
confinement. See id. 
43. See Smith, supra note 212, at 488–90. Reported physical symptoms include but are not limited 
to: severe headaches, heart palpitations, gastro-intestinal problems, loss of appetite, and dizziness. Id. 
44. See id. at 490; Grassian, supra note 212, at 332, 335–37. 
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paranoia,45 adverse impulses,46 and lethargy and debilitation.47 Rarer symptoms—
such as self-cannibalism—can be far worse.48 The rate at which prisoners suffer 
from these symptoms varies wildly according to the source and the reported 
symptom.49 But regardless of the details, the general trend is that symptoms are 
both common and severe. 
The onset of solitary confinement-induced mental harm is surprisingly fast.50 
It only takes a few days before many adverse symptoms appear in prisoners.51 For 
example, researchers have measured the co-occurrence of solitary confinement 
and neurological effects.52 They found that “even a few days of solitary 
confinement will predictably shift the electroencephalogram (EEG) pattern toward 
an abnormal pattern characteristic of stupor and delirium.”53 And after 
confinement begins, the consensus is that each additional day in solitary 
confinement ratchets up the risk of developing new symptoms and increases the 
severity of existing ones.54 
 B. Previous constitutional attacks on solitary confinement 
Challenging conditions of confinement based on the psychological harm they 
cause is difficult—if not impossible—from a federal statutory perspective. The 
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) broadly precludes such litigation. In relevant 
part, the PLRA states “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner 
confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury 
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the 
commission of a sexual act.”55 But there are two provisions of the Constitution that 
might invalidate contemporary solitary confinement practices—the Due Process56 
and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses.57 This subpart provides a brief 
overview of the applicable law in each of these areas. 
1. Solitary Confinement and the Due Process Clause 
The Due Process Clause is implicated when an individual’s life, liberty, or 
property interest is threatened by government action.58 Consequently, procedural 
 
45. See Smith, supra note 212, at 488–91; Grassian, supra note 212, at 332, 335–37. 
46. See Smith, supra note 212, at 488–92; Grassian, supra note 212, at 336. 
47. See Smith, supra note 212, at 488–93. 
48. See Grassian, supra note 212, at 351. 
49. See Grassian, supra note 212, at 332, 335–37; Smith, supra note 212, at 488–91. 
50. See infra notes 51–54.  
51. Smith, supra note 212, at 494–95. 
52. Grassian, supra note 212, at 331. 
53. Id. 
54. Smith, supra note 212, at 495. Fortunately, most prisoners eventually get better after they 
are released from solitary confinement. Id. at 495–96. 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2013) (emphasis added). 
56. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
57. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
58. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889). 
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due process challenges usually involve answering two questions: (1) does the 
challenged government action implicate a protected interest; and if so, (2) does the 
procedure protecting that interest satisfy the requirements of due process?59 
Because solitary confinement is not an inherent feature of sentences, due process 
litigation has challenged the institutional process by which prison officials place 
inmates in solitary confinement.60 Litigants advancing this theory contend that 
inmates have a liberty interest in avoiding solitary confinement and that the process 
afforded them to protect that interest was constitutionally inadequate.61 
While the liberty interests of a prisoner are not coextensive with those of a 
free person,62 relegation to solitary confinement will often implicate a liberty 
interest within the ambit of the Due Process Clause.63 Whether a stay in solitary 
confinement violates a cognizable liberty interest under the Court’s precedent 
turns on (a) the particular conditions of solitary confinement, (b) the duration of 
stay within those conditions, and (c) the difference between the solitary 
confinement conditions and those generally prevailing in the rest of the prison 
system.64 Thus, a transfer to a supermax prison will implicate a liberty interest,65 
while a thirty day stay in four-hour-per-day administrative segregation will not.66 In 
2017, more than 60,000 Americans were confined in individual cells for at least 
twenty-two hours a day for consecutive stretches of at least fifteen days.67 These 
supermax-like conditions fit within a Supreme Court announced liberty interest. 
Having established a liberty interest, the question then becomes: is the process 
afforded solitary confinement prisoners constitutionally sufficient? 
Whether a procedure meets the requirements of the Due Process clause is 
governed by a “Mathews factors” analysis: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.68  
In Wilkinson v. Austin, the Supreme Court applied the Mathews factors to 
solitary confinement transfer procedures.69 In that case, prisoners who were 
 
59. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209; 209 (2005); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
60. See, e.g., Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 209. 
61. See id. at 220–21.  
62. “[T]he fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause in no way implies that 
these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they have been 
lawfully committed.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 
63. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223–24. 
64. See generally id. 
65. Id. 
66. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485–87 (1995). 
67. See ASCA-LIMAN 2018, supra note 123, at 4, 7. 
68. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
69. 545 U.S. at 224–25. 
2020 GHASTLY SIGNS AND TOKENS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 






transferred into the Ohio State Penitentiary Supermax Prison (OSP) filed a suit 
alleging that their transfer violated the Due Process Clause.70 The 504-inmate 
capacity prison consisted entirely of single-inmate cells, wherein all prisoners were 
confined for at least twenty-three hours per day.71 Inmates were placed in OSP 
based on their security level classification within the Ohio Prison system: Level one 
was the lowest risk level; level five was the highest. 72 All level five prisoners were 
confined at OSP.73 Prisoners were classified when they first entered the prison 
system based on their characteristics such as crime of conviction, criminal history, 
and gang affiliation.74 Later, prison officials could reclassify prisoners after they 
entered Ohio’s prison system.75 
The process of prisoner classification to OSP was part of a three-tier process, 
which takes place entirely within the Ohio prison system itself.76 A prison official 
such as a correctional officer or warden initiated the process by filling out a form 
that stated the basis for the reclassification.77 A three-member committee held a 
hearing wherein they considered the proposed reclassification.78 The prisoner was 
given written notice of the hearing, where he or she was allowed to participate by 
testifying both orally and in writing.79 However, the prisoner was not allowed to call 
any witnesses or present any other form of countervailing evidence.80 The 
committee then rendered a decision and prepared an accompanying report.81 If 
they approved it, the warden at the prisoner’s current facility approved or denied 
the reclassification.82 Approval by the warden sent the matter up to the final body, 
 
70. Id. at 213–14. 
71. Id. The Court noted that:  
 
Incarceration at OSP is synonymous with extreme isolation. In contrast to any other Ohio prison, 
including any segregation unit, OSP cells have solid metal doors with metal strips along their sides and 
bottoms which prevent conversation or communication with other inmates. All meals are taken alone 
in the inmate's cell instead of in a common eating area. Opportunities for visitation are rare and in all 
events are conducted through glass walls. It is fair to say OSP inmates are deprived of almost any 
environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human contact. 
Aside from the severity of the conditions, placement at OSP is for an indefinite period of time, 
limited only by an inmate's sentence. For an inmate serving a life sentence, there is no indication how 
long he may be incarcerated at OSP once assigned there. Inmates otherwise eligible for parole lose their 
eligibility while incarcerated at OSP. 
 
Id. at 214–15. 
72. Id. at 215. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 214–215. These are three exemplar factors listed in the opinion, but apparently there 
are others. 
75. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214–15. 
76. Id. at 215–17. 




81. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 216. 
82. Id. at 216–17. 
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the Bureau of Classification.83 If the Bureau agreed with the classification, then the 
prisoner was transferred to OSP.84 If any one of the adjudicators (the committee, 
the warden, or the Bureau of Classification) disagreed with the process at any point, 
then the process stopped and the prisoner was not transferred.85 Prisoners were 
entitled to annual reviews, where the entire process was repeated via the same 
three adjudicating entities.86 
The Supreme Court held that this procedure was constitutionally adequate 
under the Due Process Clause.87 In reaching this decision, the Court did not have to 
weigh the Mathews factors because it found that all of them militated against 
finding a due process violation. 88 With respect to the first factor—the nature of the 
protected interest—it noted that the prisoners’ liberty interests were significantly 
diminished because they were already subject to incarceration.89 Transfer to OSP 
was simply a type of confinement, for which prisoners had already received 
adequate process.90 For the second factor—whether the process adequately 
protects against erroneous deprivation of the protected interest—the Court found 
that the prisoners had adequate opportunity to rebut allegations by prison 
officials91 and opined that the three-tier process for review added an extra layer of 
safety to the process.92 For the third and final factor—the significance of the 
government’s interest at stake—the Court found that the government had 
compelling interests in maintaining an efficient and manageable prison system.93 
In its opinion—which was unanimous—the Court did not address a significant 
obvious concern: that the entire OSP review process was controlled and 
adjudicated by prison officials.94 And while it is true that OSP’s three-tier review 
process provided many different points of review, one might question the 
usefulness of the system when there is no meaningful third-party oversight of it. 
Not only were the review procedures conducted exclusively by prison officials, but 
 
83. Id. at 217. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. The OSP staff also conducts a review 30 days after prisoners arrive. See id. 
86. Id. 
87. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 228.  
88. Id.at 228–29. 
89. Id. at 211.  
90. Id. at 225. 
91. Id. at 225–26. The Court addressed the lack of the ability to call witnesses:  
 
Were Ohio to allow an inmate to call witnesses or provide other attributes of an adversary hearing 
before ordering transfer to OSP, both the State's immediate objective of controlling the prisoner and its 
greater objective of controlling the prison could be defeated. This problem, moreover, is not alleviated 
by providing an exemption for witnesses who pose a hazard, for nothing in the record indicates simple 
mechanisms exist to determine when witnesses may be called without fear of reprisal. The danger to 
witnesses, and the difficulty in obtaining their cooperation, make the probable value of an adversary-
type hearing doubtful in comparison to its obvious costs. 
 
Id. at 228. 
92. Id. at 225–27. 
93. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 227–28. Specifically, the court found the administrative, fiscal, and 
safety interests of the State were incredibly important. Id. 
94. Id. at 209–30.  
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the substantive rules for security classification were devised and promulgated by 
the Ohio prison bureaucracy itself.95  
In short—barring a major shift in procedural due process jurisprudence—
Wilkinson demonstrates that due process claims are a dead letter for challenging 
long-term solitary confinement. If the prison-written, entirely internal procedures 
are enough to satisfy the Supreme Court, then prison officials can meet the due 
process threshold almost pro forma. Prisoners should look elsewhere for relief. 
2. Solitary Confinement and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause  
The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause provides 
another constitutional hook for attacking solitary confinement. After all, prolonged 
solitary confinement produces profound and lasting harm to prisoners.96 But of 
course, grievous harm isn’t enough—the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the 
death penalty against Eighth Amendment challenges.97   
So, what does it mean for a punishment to be “cruel and unusual?” The 
Court’s first modern attempt to provide consistent guidance came in Trop v. Dulles, 
when it said that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause “must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”98 But “evolving standards of decency” provide no more explanatory force 
than the text of the Eighth Amendment itself. The phrases “cruel and unusual” and 
“evolving standards of decency” both index the meaning of the Eighth Amendment 
to societal standards about the appropriateness of the punishment in question. 
Recognizing this ambiguity, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court announced four 
principles for adjudicating cruel and unusual punishment challenges.99 The 
punishment must not (1) degrade human dignity, (2) be inflicted arbitrarily, (3) be 
“clearly and totally rejected throughout society,” or (4) be “patently 
unnecessary.”100 Since Furman, the Court has only invalidated a small handful of 
sentencing-based punishments.101 Fortunately for prisoners, “evolving standards of 
decency” and other Furman-like principles cover not only court-announced 
sentences, but also the actual conditions of a prisoner’s confinement while serving 
 
95. Id. at 215–16. 
96. See supra Part I.A. 
97.See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008). The death penalty is subject to special restrictions. 
For example, the death penalty is only available for crimes that result in death. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
554 U.S. 407, 421–22 (2008) (death penalty for rape of a child violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause). Additionally, certain classes of convicts, such as juveniles and people with severe mental deficits 
cannot be subjected to the death penalty. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319–21 (2002). 
98. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (per curiam) (emphasis added). In Trop, the Supreme Court held that 
punishing a World War II army deserter by taking away his citizenship violated the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause. Id. at 101–04. 
99. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281–82 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
100. Id.  
101. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79–81 (2010) (sentencing juveniles to life sentences 
without the possibility of parole when they did not commit homicide is cruel and unusual punishment). 
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a sentence.102 Conditions of confinement include discrete acts and omissions by 
prison staff103 and pervasive structural problems created by the prison system.104 
Under the Furman line of cases, prison officials are generally given broad 
leeway to discipline prisoners so long as they act in good faith and without 
“deliberate indifference.”105 The two main ways that prison officials may run afoul 
of this rule are by: (a) acting with “deliberate indifference” to an inmate’s health or 
safety,106 or (b) the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”107 The thread tying 
these two concepts together is that prison action taken without a penological 
purpose is illegitimate.108 Because “penological purpose” is broadly construed, 
prison officials are allowed to inflict a significant amount of pain on prisoners so 
long as they have a plausible reason for doing so.109 
 C. Psychological Harm and the Eighth Amendment 
It’s clear that the Eighth Amendment imposes some restrictions on physical 
harm inflicted on prisoners110—but does it do the same for psychological harm? It’s 
an open question. The Supreme Court has never found that a purely mental harm 
rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.111 However, it has never 
categorically held that psychological harm is beyond the scope of the Eighth 
Amendment, either.112 When challenging systemic conditions of confinement, the 
Court has said that a prisoner must show that he or she has been deprived of a 
“single, identifiable human need.”113 The Court declined to define this concept in 
detail, instead providing an illustrative list of examples: food, warmth, and 
exercise.114 
For the most part, lower courts have been hesitant to expand the scope of 
what constitutes a “single, identifiable human need.”115 Importantly, many courts 
 
102. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 361 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
103. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 733–38 (2002) (tying prisoner to hitching post in the hot 
sun for seven hours as punishment was cruel and unusual punishment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
104–05 (1976) (“deliberate indifference” by prison staff to prisoner’s serious medical needs violated 
prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights). 
104. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 517–19 (2011) (prison overcrowding violated Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause).  
105. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839–40 (1994). 
106. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839–40 (“subjective 
recklessness as used in the criminal law” is the test for whether a prison official was deliberately 
indifferent to the health or safety of a prisoner). 
107. Hope, 536 U.S. at 737 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). 
108. See id. 
109. See, e.g., Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1995) (placement of prisoner in 
solitary confinement without clothes, running water, a mattress, blanket, pillows, or toiletries did not 
violate Eighth Amendment). 
110. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878) (citing the Blackstone Commentaries for 
the proposition that the Eighth Amendment prevents physically tortuous methods of execution such as 
disembowelment and burning prisoners alive). 
111. See The Psychology of Cruelty, supra note 334, at 1252 n.20. 
112. See Federica Coppola, The Brain in Solitude: An (Other) Eighth Amendment Challenge to 
Solitary Confinement, 6 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 184, 189–91 (2019) (discussing the open-ended application of 
the “human needs standard”). 
113. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). 
114. Id. 
115. See The Psychology of Cruelty, supra note 334, at 1260–61. 
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have rejected social interaction as a valid “identifiable human need.”116 A review of 
the cases since Wilson shows that most lower courts have required a showing of 
some sort of physical harm to allow Eighth Amendment challenges to solitary 
confinement to move forward.117  
Bucking this trend, in Ruiz v. Johnson, a district court held that Texas’s entire 
solitary confinement system violated the Eighth Amendment because of the 
psychological harm it inflicted.118 The court found that: 
[T]he administrative segregation units of the Texas prison 
system deprive inmates of the minimal necessities of civilized life. 
While the court recognizes and appreciates the formidable task 
of those public servants saddled with the task of dealing with 
problematic, violent inmates, even those inmates who must be 
segregated from general population for their own or others' 
safety retain some constitutional rights. Texas' administrative 
segregation units violate those rights through extreme 
deprivations which cause profound and obvious psychological 
pain and suffering. Texas' administrative segregation units are 
virtual incubators of psychoses-seeding illness in otherwise 
healthy inmates and exacerbating illness in those already 
suffering from mental infirmities.119  
While the court invalidated the scheme for all prisoners, it specifically noted 
the heightened harm facing prisoners with mental illness that predated their stays 
in solitary confinement.120 
Other courts addressing solitary-confinement-caused psychological harm 
have found that relegating prisoners with preexisting serious mental illness to 
solitary confinement violates the Eighth Amendment.121 For these courts, the 
presence of serious mental illness acts as a force multiplier, which raises the mental 
pressures of solitary confinement to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.122 
Moreover, in addition to creating present cruel and unusual punishment, prolonged 
 
116. See, e.g., McMillan v. Wiley, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1251 (D. Colo. 2011).  
117. See, e.g., Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996), amended on denial of reh’g, 135 
F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that conditions in solitary confinement related to “exercise, noise, 
lighting, ventilation, personal hygiene, and food and water” could create an Eighth Amendment 
violation). 
118. 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 940 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Ruiz v. United 
States, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001), adhered to on remand, 154 F. Supp. 2d 975 (S.D. Tex. 2001). 
119. Id. at 907.  
120. Id. at 911–13. 
121. Jones’El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1125–26 (W.D. Wis. 2001); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. 
Supp. 1146, 1264–66 (N.D. Cal. 1995); cf. U.S. Dep’t Justice, Effective Prison Mental Health Services: 
Guidelines to Expand and Improve Treatment 41–42 (2004), https://nicic.gov/effective-prison-mental-
health-services-guidelines-expand-and-improve-treatment (finding that solitary confinement is 
generally inadvisable for prisoners with severe mental illness). 
122. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (placing the seriously mentally ill 
in prolonged solitary confinement is “the mental equivalent of putting an asthmatic in a place with little 
air to breath”). 
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solitary confinement is likely to further aggravate mental illness, which creates a 
substantial risk of future harm.123 A key distinction between Ruiz and the pre-
existing mental illness-based cases is that the latter explicitly tie constitutional 




III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT IN PROLONGED SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 
The legal reasoning applied to ban the use of solitary confinement on seriously 
mentally ill inmates should be expanded to eliminate—or at least significantly 
curtail—the use of prolonged solitary confinement for all prisoners in the United 
States. A large body of empirical research demonstrates that prolonged isolation in 
solitary confinement causes serious mental illness in most ordinarily constituted 
prisoners.124 And mental illness is mental illness—its multiplicative effect on the 
mental harm caused by solitary confinement does not differentiate between 
preexisting mental illness and confinement-induced mental illness. If preexisting 
serious mental illness precludes the transfer of an inmate to solitary confinement, 
then an inmate’s mental illness caused by solitary confinement precludes her 
continued presence therein. 
Drawing on the empirical research, this Part proposes two arguments in the 
alternative for reaching the same conclusion. The primary argument is that 
prisoners have a categorical right to be free from confinement-caused severe 
mental illness.125 This argument is a straightforward application of the long-
established principle that prisoners have a right to healthcare and to be confined in 
a minimally healthy environment.126 In the alternative, the second argument is that 
even if prisoners do not have an absolute right to be free from severe mental illness, 
the harm attendant to such illnesses constitute confinement in conditions that 
violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.127 
 A. The Categorical Argument 
Prisoners challenging their conditions of confinement generally need to allege 
that the challenged conditions deprive them of a “single, identifiable human 
need.”128 Although “single identifiable human need” is a vague term,129 an inmate’s 
right to basic healthcare and to be free from significant harm to their health falls 
unquestionably within its ambit.130 This right is so strong, that courts have even 
 
123. Id. (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 30–32 (1993) (Eighth Amendment claim could be 
based on possible future harm from secondhand smoke)). 
124. See supra notes 11–45 and accompanying text. 
125. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
126. See discussion infra Section II.A. 
127. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
128. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991); see supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text. 
129. See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text. 
130. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 30–32 (1993); Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 596 
(5th Cir. 2015) (holding that excessive heat created cognizable Eighth Amendment claim because it 
created a serious risk of medical complications for prisoners with high blood pressure). 
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allowed prisoners to bring claims based on possible future harm to their health.131 
And far from being a distinct class, “[c]ourts treat an inmate’s mental health claims 
just as seriously as any physical health claims,” which create cognizable claims 
under the Eighth Amendment.132 Therefore, under the categorical argument, 
inmates in solitary confinement don’t have to reinvent the wheel—they just have 
to show that they are an unrecognized spoke in the current one.  
Because solitary confinement causes severe mental illness, an inmate’s 
confinement therein deprives her of the “single, identifiable human need” of being 
reasonably healthy. All the available empirical research demonstrates that even 
short stays in solitary confinement cause severe mental illness in the majority of 
otherwise healthy inmates.133 Many prisoners develop a DSM-V recognized 
illness.134 Others suffer from a wide variety of severe symptoms, such as delirium, 
hallucinations, and self-mutilation.135 And, while currently the DSM-V does not 
recognize “SHU Syndrome”136 or a similar analog, the constellation of solitary 
confinement caused symptoms rises to the level of a severe mental illness.137  
Replying that solitary confinement does not cause severe mental illness in all 
inmates is no response. Courts have long held that a significant risk of harm is 
enough to create a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim.138 For example, in Helling 
v. McKinney, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner could bring an Eighth 
Amendment claim because of possible future risk to their health caused by 
secondhand smoke in a prison.139 By contrast, solitary confinement predictably 
causes severe mental illness in most inmates within days of confinement.140 Under 
Helling and its progeny, solitary confinement’s risk is significant enough to create a 
cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. 
Given the state of the case law, prisons are most likely to resist the 
abovementioned argument on empirical rather than legal grounds. The most 
 
131. Helling, 509 U.S. at 30-35 (stating that the Eighth Amendment claim could be based on 
possible future harm from secondhand smoke). 
132. DePaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added); accord Rhodes v. 
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 364 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (listing the provision of mental health care 
as a relevant factor in whether prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment); see also Woodward v. 
Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., 368 F.3d 917 (7th Cir. 2004); Doty v. Cty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990); Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1989); Ramos 
v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980). 
133. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text; see generally Smith, supra note 212, at 495. 
134. See Brian O. Hagan et al., History of Solitary Confinement is Associated with Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder Symptoms Among Individuals Recently Released from Prison, 95 J. Urb. Health, 141, 146-
47 (2017); Stanford University Human Rights in Trauma Mental Health Lab, Mental Health Consequences 
Following Release from Long-Term Solitary Confinement in California, 2, 7–9. The DSM-V is the most 
widely used and respected reference for psychiatric taxonomy. See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013). 
135. See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text. 
136. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
137. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
138. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). 
139. Id.  
140. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.  
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straightforward line of attack is that solitary confinement does not cause severe 
mental illness. But it would be a difficult argument to make because there is no 
evidence that solitary confinement does not cause severe mental illness, while 
there is plenty of evidence that it does.141 Lacking any evidence of their own, prison 
officials would have to portray existing studies and data as so flawed that courts 
should not rely on them. Relatedly, prisons could note solitary confinement caused 
symptoms are not “severe mental illness” because they do not fit neatly within a 
recognized DSM-V diagnosis.142 
To a very limited extent, their concerns are valid. It is undeniable that the 
existing literature is imperfect.143 And certainly the DSM-V does not currently 
recognize “SHU Syndrome.”144 But even acknowledging these limitations, prison 
officials would be hard-pressed to seriously contend that symptoms such as 
delirium, hallucinations, and self-mutilation do not constitute severe mental 
illness.145 It is highly unlikely that, even with the acknowledged methodological 
problems,146 the centuries-old, widespread reporting of these symptoms is 
inaccurate. And the reality of these symptoms for prisoners is what matters—not 
the perfection of studies documenting their misery. While it would be nice to have 
an officially recognized solitary confinement syndrome, the taxonomical 
classification of mental disorders is an exercise in normative psychiatry;147 the 
absence of the psychiatric community’s normative gloss on a group of documented 
symptoms does not make their effects any less real. Under any reasonable rubric, 
the myriad of symptoms that prisoners in prolonged solitary confinement suffer 
from would qualify as a severe mental illness.148 
 B. The Harm Argument 
If courts do not accept the categorical argument, they could invalidate solitary 
confinement on a theory of harm. As one lower court noted, placing inmates with 
severe mental illness in solitary confinement is the “equivalent of putting an 
asthmatic in a place with little air to breath.”149 In other words, solitary confinement 
multiplies the inherent metal harm attendant to severe mental illness.150 On this 
theory, lower courts have already prohibited prisons from relegating prisoners with 
preexisting severe mental illness to solitary confinement.151 But there is no reason 
that they should stop there. Solitary confinement causes severe mental illness in 
 
141. See supra Part I.A. 
142. See supra note 134. 
143. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
144. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
145. See supra notes 40–55 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
147. See Marco Stier, Normative Preconditions for the Assessment of Mental Disorder, 4 Frontiers 
Psychol. 1 (2013), https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00611. 
148. See supra note 40–55 and accompanying text. 
149. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1265 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
150. See Grassian, supra note 212, at 329. Explicitly, the literature is silent on the etiology behind 
this multiplicate effect. But it’s not a great leap to infer that the same features of solitary confinement 
that cause mental illness have an exacerbating effect on preexisting mental illness. 
151. Jones’El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1117–21 (W.D. Wis. 2001); Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 
1261–66; Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 913–15 (S.D. Tex. 1999); see also supra notes 118–123 and 
accompanying text. 
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the majority of inmates.152 And under this analysis, whether severe mental illness 
predates or postdates solitary confinement is not important because the quantum 
of harm—and therefore the constitutional infirmity—is identical.  
Litigants advancing this argument should be careful to frame it in empirical, 
rather than empathic terms. For example, a recent Harvard Law Review Note 
suggested that prisoners could challenge solitary confinement by using 
neuroscientific research to show that solitary confinement subjects inmates to 
“social isolation,” which in turn causes grave mental harm.153 Grave mental harm 
sounds more grievous than “social isolation,” but in reality, that argument is simply 
placing a fancy gloss on extreme discomfort. And while it has strong empathic force, 
the problem is that grave harm, either physical or mental, has not been enough to 
abolish a great many punishments; being free from harm is the beginning, but not 
the end of a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim.154 To create Eighth Amendment 
protection, an inmate must allege that the challenged condition subjects them to a 
specific type of harm that the Court is prepared to recognize.  
The type of harm that inmates subjected to solitary confinement endure is 
either the onset of a new health problem or the multiplication of the harm from a 
confinement-caused one.155 Framing the harm of solitary confinement as a health 
problem rather than as grave mental harm places the issue in a different legal (and 
rhetorical) light. Rather than drawing on the courts’ empathy, this argument draws 
on their rationality. Rhetorically, health-based arguments are stronger than those 
grounded in mental suffering (or empathy) because the empirical evidence 
demonstrates that apart from being merely uncomfortable, prolonged solitary 
causes lasting measurable health harm.156 In turn, the features of solitary 
confinement that cause the health problems to begin with conspire to exacerbate 
their harmful effects on prisoners.157 Under this analysis, the multiplicative effect 
of solitary confinement on the already extreme harm of severe mental illness 
means that prisons must discontinue the use of solitary confinement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Solitary confinement is a dreadful practice, but there are signs of change on 
the horizon. The lower courts are sympathetic to the plight of, at least some, 
prisoners in prolonged solitary confinement.158 And although most higher courts 
have never directly addressed the issue, past and present members of the Supreme 
 
152. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text; see generally Smith, supra note 212, at 495. 
153. See supra note 334, at 1265-67, 1270. 
154. The death penalty has, mostly, withstood Eighth Amendment challenges. See supra note 98 
and accompanying text. 
155. See supra Part II.A. 
156. See supra notes 25–39 and accompanying text. 
157. See Grassian, supra note 21, at 349; Smith, supra note 212, at 482–83. 
158. See supra notes 118–123 and accompanying text. 
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Court have clearly signaled their aversion to contemporary solitary confinement 
practices.159 
To take the next step, litigants need a properly framed legal hook. Solitary 
confinement-induced mental illness is the perfect vehicle for a constitutional 
challenge because it relies on incrementally expanding existing rules rather than on 
crafting an entirely new one. Moreover, reframing the issue in terms of mental 
health transmutes an opaque moral matter—about which, many apparently still 
disagree—into a clear medical problem that cannot be easily dismissed. At worst, 
mental health-based litigation will slowly improve conditions for prisoners; and at 
best, it will outright banish the “secret punishment” from American prisons. 160  
 
 
159. See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208–10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (inviting legal 
challenge to solitary confinement); Apodaca v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 5 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari). 
160. See Dickens, supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
